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Abstract 
This paper investigates the multiple mediating effects of opportunism and cooperation on the relationship between relationship-
specific investments and partnership performance in the Turkish automotive distribution channel. The theoretical view of this study 
is based on the relational view of inter-organizational competitive advantage that provides an alternative perspective for 
expropriation effect of specific investments. In order to test the effect of multiple mediators on partnership performance, the 
empirical data were collected from the vehicle dealers in the Turkish automotive distribution channel. The findings show that 
relationship-specific investments mediated by opportunistic behavior and cooperative behavior have a greater positive effect on 
partnership performance.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper aims to examine the effects of relationship-specific investments on the performance of inter-
organizational partnerships. Transaction cost theory and relational governance view provide alternative theoretical 
perspectives for explaining the influence of relationship-specific investments on partnership performance. According 
to the transaction cost theory, relationship-specific investments increase the risk of opportunism and hence transaction 
costs (Williamson, 1985; Heide and Stump, 1995; Lui et al., 2009). When one of the parties to the relationship may 
opportunistically expropriate the value of the investment, a safeguarding problem arises due to the idiosyncratic nature 
of the assets (Heide, 1994; Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Although contractual agreements as safeguarding 
mechanisms can be used to minimize the risk of opportunistic exploitation (Williamson, 1983), residual opportunism 
risk continues to exist when the parties are able to write contracts which only differ in a degree of completeness (Artz 
and Brush, 2000; Wang, 2010). Relevantly, in an incomplete contract setting, relationship-specific investments give 
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rise to ex post quasi-rents that may be expropriated by the other parties who can impose renegotiation of the 
conditions or early termination of the contract (Klein, 1978; Williamson, 1985). The hold-up problems over the ex 
post division of returns from the specific investments induce the parties to underinvest in specific assets. In this case, 
the parties cannot generate the expected benefits from the relationship and hence unilateral gains from opportunistic 
behavior reduce the performance of inter-organizational partnerships (Parkhe, 1993; Pilling et al., 1994; Luo, 2007; 
Lui et al., 2009).  
 
However, unlike the effect of unilateral investments, bilateral relationship-specific investments as self-enforcing 
safeguards create a reciprocal hostage effect against the quasi rent expropriation from the opportunistic actions of the 
parties (Williamson, 1983). The lock-in effect of reciprocal commitments promotes the behavior that ensures the 
continuance of the relationships by generating quasi-rent stream which would be lost in the event of termination (Katz, 
1989; Heide, 1994; Sarkar et al., 2001). Accordingly, drawing on the resource-based view and the transaction cost 
theory, the relational view of inter-organizational competitive advantage (Dyer, 1997) suggests that high asset 
specificity does not necessarily lead to increased transaction costs. The efficiency criterion of this view is to maximize 
the joint transaction value from the relationship based on the long-term cooperation beyond the minimization of 
transaction costs -Larsen et al., 2007). As network partners make symmetric 
investments dedicated to the relationship in order to establish cooperative relationships, they can realize competitive 
advantage (i.e., relational rents) through knowledge sharing and relational learning and hence reduce opportunism in 
practice (Dyer, 1996; Sawhney Celly et al., 1999; Ghosh and John, 1999; Rokkan et al., 2003; Wu et al., 2006; 
Mukherji and Francis, 2008). In conclusion, relationship-specific investments produce substantial positive impact on 
partnership performance by discouraging opportunism at relatively low cost and encouraging value creation through 
complementary coordinated actions in interdependent task environment (Anderson and Narus, 1990; Dyer, 1996; 
Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999; Lui et al., 2009). 
 
On the basis of the above considerations, this study intends to explore the multiple mediating effects on the 
relationship between relationship-specific investments and partnership performance in the Turkish automotive 
distribution channel. Specifically, the authors suggest that relationship-specific investments will result in improved 
performance when they foster cooperative behavior with a decrease in opportunistic actions (bonding effect of specific 
investments). The main contribution of the paper is to present an alternative perspective to the expropriation effect of 
specific investments. By doing so, this paper shows that relationship-specific investments can also reduce 
opportunistic expropriation through the leverage effect of the potential gains from cooperation and hence leads to 
higher partnership performance. In addition, the most important meaning of the study for managers is that automakers 
and their dealers should follow a cooperative strategy to gain relational rents from specific investments, if they expect 
a high level of performance in inter-organizational relationship. 
 
2. Literature Review And Hypotheses  
2.1. Relationship-specific investments: opportunistic behavior vs. cooperative behavior  
According to the transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1985) relationship-specific investments defined as the degree 
to which assets are dedicated to a particular relationship create a lock-in situation for the investing party in inter-
organizational relationships. Switching to alternative relationships cannot be achieved without sacrifice of productive 
value because specific investments lead to small-number bargaining problems by reducing the number of potential 
trading partners. Whenever relationship-specific investments have lower value in alternative uses this situation results 
in a stream of potentially appropriable quasi-rents (Joskow, 2008). In this case, investment in specific assets may 
expose investing party to the risk of opportunistic behavior by the other party, who seeks to generate above-normal 
returns from the specific investments and hence maximize its own unilateral gains.  
 
H1a: Relationship-specific investments are positively related with opportunistic behavior.  
 
However, both partners may undertake high specific investments that increase bilateral dependency (Windsperger, 
1994; Jap and Anderson, 2003). When the quasi-rent stream generated by bilateral investments exceeds the potential 
hold-up gains from opportunistic behavior, relationship-specific investments are likely to bond the parties and 
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discourage opportunistic behavior that is the reason of early termination (Klein et al., 1978; Rokkan et al., 2003; 
Hendrikse and Windsperger, 2011).  
 
H1b: Relationship-specific investments are negatively related with opportunistic behavior.  
 
In this second scenario, the bonding effect of specific investments motivates both partners to behave cooperatively 
in order to realize relational rents (Heide, 1994; Rokkan et al., 2003; Hendrikse and Windsperger, 2011). As the 
parties make bilateral specific investments to create competitive advantage, cooperation facilitates the coordination of 
activities between the partners (Lui et al., 2009). 
 
H2: Relationship-specific investments are positively related with cooperative behavior.   
2.2. Opportunistic behavior and partnership performance 
In an incomplete contract setting, bargaining over the appropriable ex post quasi-rents creates a negative effect on 
ex ante investment incentives (Joskow, 2008). When the success of a relationship depends on the collective efforts, 
utilize the potential benefits of the relationship-specific knowledge creation (Luo, 2007; Lui et al., 2009). 
 
H3: Opportunistic behavior is negatively related with partnership performance.  
2.3. Cooperative behavior and partnership performance 
Inter-organizational cooperation reduces the costs of transferring resources and knowledge by facilitating the 
coordination of activities between the partners (Grant, 1996). The effective integration of knowledge allows the 
partners to create competitive advantage through performance-enhancing innovation (Powell et al., 1996; Dyer and 
Singh, 1998; Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000). Accordingly, cooperation leads to better performance by decreasing 
knowledge transfer costs and creating joint transaction value (Luo, 2002; Lui et al., 2009).  
   
H4: Cooperative behavior is positively related with partnership performance. 
2.4. Relationship-specific investments and partnership performance: direct and indirect effects 
If the partners make bilateral specific investments to provide customized distribution services, they become more 
likely to continue the relationship in order to gain joint value by long-term orientation (Heide and John, 1990; Ono and 
Kubo, 2009). In connection with this argument, relationship-specific investments may be a source of relational rents 
and competitive advantage that results in higher partnership performance (Dyer, 1996; Mucherji and Francis, 2008).    
 
H5: Relationship-specific investments are positively related with partnership performance. 
 
In addition to the direct effect of relationship-specific investments, relationship-specific investments mediated by 
opportunistic behavior and cooperative behavior also have an impact on partnership performance. Because 
relationship-specific investments are more likely to result in higher performance when (1) they can control 
opportunism at relatively low cost, and (2) promote cooperative behavior in achieving effective coordination (Dyer, 
1996). 
 
H6: The multiple mediators (opportunism and cooperation) strengthen the positive impact of relationship-specific 
investments on partnership performance.  
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3. Methodology
3.1. Research goal
The aim of this research is to investigate the multiple mediating effects of opportunism and cooperation on the
relationship between relationship-specific investments and partnership performance in the Turkish automotive
distribution channel. In this purpose, the data obtained from the Turkish automotive distribution channel were
analyzed through SPSS (version 18) statistical package program. To test the effect of multiple mediators in SPSS the
script of Preacher and Hayes was used (2008). Consistent with the research purpose, research model is presented as
follows: 
Figure 1. Research model
According to the multiple mediation model with two mediators (M1= opportunism and M2= cooperation) in the
context of this study, path a(n) represents the direct effects of independent variable (IV: relationship-specific 
investments) on mediating variables (M(n): opportunism and cooperation), path b(n) represents the direct effects of 
M(n) on dependent variable (DV=  partnership performance) and path c(n) represents the direct effect of IV on DV
and the indirect effects of IV on DV through M(n). In the mediation analysis, the indirect effects of IV on DV through
M(n) is defined as the product of path a and path b, that is, a1b1 and a2b2. In this case, the total indirect effect of IV on 
DV is the sum of the two specific indirect effects (a1b1 + a2b2). The total effect of IV on DV (c) is thus the sum of the
direct effect of IV (c-prime path: c ) and the total indirect effect of IV on DV: c = c + a1b1 + a2b2.
3.2. Sample and data collection
To test the hypotheses, the empirical data were collected through a questionnaire-based survey from the Turkish 
vehicle dealers of eleven different automotive brands (Tofas-Fiat, Dogus-Volkswagen, Ford Otosan-Ford, Oyak 
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Renault-Renault, Peugeot, Toyota, General Motors-Opel, Honda, Nissan, Hyundai Assan-Hyundai and Temsa-
Mitsubishi) that have a total of 78.70% market share in the categories of passenger vehicles and light commercial
vehicles. After determining the automotive brands to be covered in the research, the scope of the research was limited
with six provinces (Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara, Antalya, Bursa and Konya) that approximately represent 64 percent of 
market share in the related vehicle categories. The statistics obtained from the internet sites of the selected dealers
indicate that there are a total of 101 dealers that operate in the selected six provinces. Table 1 represents the sample
structure of this research.
Table 1. Sample structure
Based on this sample the questionnaire was sent out electronically to 101 executives of the Turkish automotive 
dealers. Data collection process was completed in three phases. Only 22 questionnaires were returned in response to
the first call of the survey. In the second call the number of completed questionnaires raised to 50. After the third call
the process was terminated because only 4 questionnaire forms were returned. Thus a total of 54 completed 
questionnaires were received. The effective response rate is 53.47%. Figure 2 depicts the questionnaire distribution
according to the dealer brand.
Figure 2. Questionnaire distribution
co
un
t
Dealer brand
Automotive brand Market share in the
categories of passenger
vehicles and light commercial
vehicles* (%)
Number of dealers in the
selected provinces
Tofas (Fiat) 14.45 14
Dogus Oto (Volkswagen) 8.39 9
Ford Otosan (Ford) 10.83 10
Oyak Renault (Renault) 12.48 13
Peugeot 5.70 9
Toyota 5.26 8
General Motors (Opel) 5.46 10
Honda 2.14 7
Nissan 1.74 8
Temsa (Mitsubishi) 0.85 5
Hyundai Assan (Hyundai) 6.56 8
Total 78.70 101
*Annual assessment report of OSD (Automotive Manufacturers Association in Turkey), 2010
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3.3. Measurement 
Relationship-specific investments. Relationship-specific investments refer to the non-redeployable tangible and 
intangible investments that are specialized to a relationship (Williamson, 1975, 1985). If the relationship were 
terminated, the value of the investments in relationship-specific assets would be largely lost because they have much 
lower value in other relationships (Heide and John, 1988). For instance, in relationships between automakers and their 
dealers, dealers may need unique physical facilities (i.e., dedicated equipment) with a set of professional know-how 
and skills to provide sales and ma Accordingly, the authors 
built on Heide and John  (1988) construct of specific investments as the extent to which a dealer has invested in 
specific assets in its relationship with the automaker and measured this construct with six items. These items are: (1) 
we have specific know-how of products and services of the automaker, (2) we spend a lot of time and effort to learn 
specific methods in order to effectively, (3) we spend a lot of time and 
(4) we spend a lot of time and effort to 
learn the special selling techniques for products and services of the automaker, (5) we make investments to the 
specialized equipment and technology in order to sell the products and services of the automaker, (6) we spend a lot of 
time and effort to generate a sales district for products and services of the automaker  
Opportunistic behavior. Opportunism refers to the self-interest seeking behavior characterized by calculated efforts 
in the form of breaching of the contract, withholding or distorting of information, shirking from the obligations, 
appropriating the returns from joint investments and etc. (John, 1984; Williamson, 1985; Anderson, 1988; Dahlstrom 
and Nygaard, 1999; Lui et al., 2009). In this study, a four-item scale was constructed by utilizing the prior 
operationalization of Dahlstrom and Nygaard (1999) and Jap and Anderson (2003). The items of the scale for 
opportunism are: (1) the automaker has kept its promises made when we entered the relationship (R), (2) the 
automaker does not make commitments that it would be unable to fulfill (R), (3) the automaker always gives correct 
information about the market and sector (R), (4) there is regular flow of information from the automaker to us (R) 
). 
Cooperative behavior. Automakers and their dealers interact to make decisions regarding marketing, local sales and 
service campaigns, advertising, promotional activities, showroom modernization and future growth plans. In 
connection with the degree of interaction between the partners, inter-firm cooperation refers to the extent to which the 
automaker a
product line (Reve, 1986; Dahlstrom and Nygaard,1999). To measure the construct of cooperation a six-item scale was 
adapted from the studies of Reve and Stern (1986) and Dahlstrom and Nygaard (1999). These items are: (1) we 
cooperate with the automaker to make future growth plans, (2) we cooperate with the automaker in local sales and 
service campaigns, (3) we cooperate with the automaker to design market plans, (4) we cooperate with the automaker 
to design advertisement and promotion activities, (5) we cooperate with the automaker in modernization of showroom 
& services, (6) most of our activities require close cooperation with the automaker ha = 0.91). 
Partnership performance. Following Dwyer et al. (1987), Saxton (1997) and Lui et al. (2009) the authors used a 
single-item measure for partnership performance that reflects the satisfaction level of relationship. This item is that we 
generally have a satisfactory relationship with the automaker. 
 
All the indicators of each construct were measured on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1= strongly disagree to 
7= strongly agree. Reliability analysis was performed to assess the internal consistency of measures of the constructs. 
the recommended threshold level of 0.70 (Hair et al., 1998). In 
addition the potential for response bias was examined by comparing early versus late responses. The test of 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) shows no significant differences for the measures between early and 
 an evidence for the 
external validity of the study. However, relatively small size of the sample is the main limitation of this research that 
provides future research opportunities to improve the validity of the measures.  
3.4. Analyses and results 
relationship- While 
variable of opportunism has a relatively low mean value  
 
982   Tugba Gurcaylilar-Yenidogan et al. /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  99 ( 2013 )  976 – 985 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 reports the results of multiple mediation model. In this model, all the paths were typically quantified with 
regression coefficients calculated by multiple linear regression analyses. The mediation analyses were carried out for 
variables when all the paths a(n), b(n) and c(n) are statistically significant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean S.D.
1. Partnership performance 54 1.00 7.00 5.65 1.53
2. Opportunism 54 1.00 7.00 2.24 1.46
3. Cooperation 54 1.17 7.00 5.55 1.41
4. Relationship-specific investments 54 1.40 7.00 5.65 1.28
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Consistent with the prediction of H1b, the results indicate that the relationship between relationship-specific 
investments and opportunism are negative and significant (b= 0.832, p<0.01) based on the bonding effect of 
relationship-specific investments. On the other hand, the relationship between relationship-specific investments and 
cooperation is positive and significant, in support of H2 (b= +0.852, p<0.01). Therefore the results provide support for 
the direct effects of independent variable on mediators when a1 and a2 are significant. As to the direct effects of 
mediators on dependent variable, opportunism has a significantly negative relationship with partnership performance 
(b= 0.398, p<0.01) while cooperation has a significantly positive relationship with the same dependent variable (b= 
+0.349, p<0.05). These findings support H3 and H4. In addition to the direct effects, the results also indicate that each 
of the separate indirect effects as well as the total indirect effect of mediators on partnership performance is significant 
(see normality tests for indirect effects). Furthermore, based on H5, the positive direct effect of relationship-specific 
investments on partnership performance (b= +0.278) is acceptable at the significance level of 0.057. At last, the 
finding reflecting the total effect of relationship-specific investments on partnership performance (b= +0.907, p<0.01) 
shows that the relationship-specific investments mediated by opportunism and cooperation have a greater positive 
effect on partnership performance, in support of H6. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this study is to examine the effects of relationship-specific investments on the performance of inter-
organizational partnerships. This study contributes to the literature by considering the indirect effects of relationship-
specific investments on the partnership performance through multiple mediators (opportunism and cooperation) as 
well as their direct effect. The results obtained from the Turkish automotive distribution channel indicate that 
relationship-specific investments mediated by opportunism and cooperation have a greater positive effect on 
partnership performance. It means that relationship-specific investments result in higher performance by decreasing 
opportunistic expropriation through the leverage effect of the potential gains from cooperation. Thus this study is 
supported by the predictions of relational governance view that offers an alternative explanation to the transaction cost 
theory, which is mainly based on the bonding effect of specific investments. According to the reasoning of the 
relational view, the bonding effect of specific investments motivates both partners to behave cooperatively by 
facilitating the coordination of operations because competitive advantage generated by bilateral investments exceeds 
the potential hold-up gains from opportunistic behavior.  
 
The results also have some practical implications for managers doing business in Turkey. Investing in relationship-
specific assets increases competitive advantage of the network, since it provides a relational safeguard against 
opportunism and hence facilitates cooperative orientation to achieve common goals. Accordingly, this study suggests 
that managers should follow a cooperative strategy supported by relationship-specific investments in order to improve 
partnership performance.  
 
Although this study has some important theoretical and managerial implications as mentioned above, it includes 
some limitations that create opportunities for future research. First, the research design of the study uses a single 
source of respondents. Future studies are needed to explore the relationships between the variables using multiple 
sources of respondents from both automakers and dealers in order to obtain a more holistic view for explaining the 
role of relationship-specific investments in improving performance. Second, the sample of this study is relatively 
small as it only includes 54 dealers operating in the Turkish automotive distribution channel. Therefore the validity of 
the measures must be improved by using a larger sample. In addition to this, future studies should pay attention to 
collect data from different inter-organizational relationships in order to increase the generalizability of the results.  
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